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INTRODUCTION
Howard C. Anawalt*
This issue of the Santa Clara Law Review is devoted to
the subject of computer law. Whether or not there is a
separate field of law which can be properly labeled "computer
law" is a topic worthy of discussion in itself. Probably the
term is merely functional-an umbrella covering a wide variety of legal problems which arise in connection with the development and use of computers.
Nevertheless, there are certain areas of law which bear a
special imprint and which have been changed by the emergence of computer technology. Certainly at the top of this list
is intellectual property law. The symposium devotes special
attention to the problems of intellectual property law in the
context of the development of computers.
PATENTS

In his article, "Patent Protection of Computer
Software-Practical Insights," James A. Sheridan draws on
his practical experience to assess the utility of patent law as a
means of protecting the intellectual work product involved in
the creation of computer software. For more than a decade
lawyers have puzzled over whether patent law offers an appropriate and useful means of protecting the work effort which
goes into the development of computer software. On the one
hand, patent law presents the traditional means of protecting
inventions. Once a patent has been granted, the holder has
the right to control the use of his or her method or process.
© 1983 by Howard C. Anawalt
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Patent law offers the bedrock of protection of intellectual
work products.1
For all of its attractiveness as a means of protecting inventions, there are great roadblocks when it comes to employing patent law to protect computer software. The most fundamental difficulty stems from the nature of software
developments. To be sure, many software developments are
"inventions" just as surely as the telegraph, the tape recorder,
and the automatic bowling pin setter are. Computer programs,
like other inventions, put ideas into action and thus get jobs
done. However, a computer program, by its nature tends to be
simply a description of a problem-solving method, rather than
the actual embodiment of a step-by-step process in a machine
or some physical process. Thus, software developments verge
on being claims to the right to own ideas or sets of ideas, and
ideas in themselves cannot be made the subject of patent law
and thus preempted from the public domain.' In computer
development the ideal, from the point of view of the inventor,
would be the capability of patenting one's original algorithm
or step-by-step solution to a problem. However, algorithms in
themselves are not proper subjects of patent under the statute, because the granting of a patent to an algorithm would
preempt use of the idea.'
Sheridan's article takes up the difficulties of using patent
law as a means of protecting software. First of all, he concludes that algorithms may be protectable if the algorithm
"does more than represent a scientific principle or law of nature, and instead becomes a vehicle for communicating a solution to a complex problem in a particular environment. .... "

The article goes on to review the landmark cases of Gottschalk v. Benson, Parker v. Flook, Diamond v. Diehr, and a
1.

Holding a patent does not give the patentee ironclad protection of the pro-

cess, however. The patent is essentially "a ticket to a lawsuit." The patent is presumptively valid, but its validity is subject to attack in the infringement lawsuit. 35
U.S.C. § 282. Furthermore, the allegedly offending use may not turn out to be an

infringement.
2. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
3. In Gottschalk the claimants had sought a patent for a method of converting
a coded form of decimal numbers, binary coded decimals, into their pure binary;
form. At the time the formula had considerable utility. The Supreme Court rejected
the claim, stating "[i]f the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-

empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself." 409 U.S. at 257.
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series of other cases decided by the Court of Claims and Patent Appeals.
It is important to emphasize that many practitioners who
are not patent lawyers will be called upon to make initial assessments concerning what vehicles are appropriate for protecting computer intellectual property, and thus they must be
prepared to understand the patent process and its limitations.' Sheridan's article helps provide a sound basis for doing
this.
Sheridan concludes his article with some practical observations concerning the necessity and appropriateness of making complete disclosure of one's invention in order to achieve
a patent. He also discusses the time involved in the issuance
of a patent and how that affects the utility of patent protection. Finally, he argues that patent protection may be used in
tandem with trade secret protection during the period of time
that the application for the patent is pending. Thus, the decision on whether patent provides the best means of protection
may be postponed until the patent is ready to issue.
COPYRIGHT AND TRADE SECRET

A second method for protecting intellectual property in
the computer field is the use of copyright law. Copyright offers one of the strongest vehicles for protection, especially
since the video game cases and, more recently, Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.' Copyright law is a
newer method for protecting inventions, when compared with
patent law, because it has required somewhat of a divergence
from the traditional notions of copyright in order to achieve
protection of such things as object code and operating systems
programs. Like patent law, copyright does not protect ideas in
themselves. What it does protect is the particular expression
of an idea when that expression is fixed in some tangible medium. Thus, computer programs, when fixed in object code
have been ruled to be copyrightable because these are in effect
expressions or communications which can be ultimately un4. Of course, only a lawyer admitted to the Patent Bar may undertake a search
and process a patent application. 35 U.S.C. §31, 32, 33. See Jones v. Raymond Ill

Organization, Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. (C.D. Cal. 1979).
5.

714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1983).
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derstood by human beings with the aid of machines.'
Copyright is simple to achieve. One simply fixes an expression in a medium, and the basic requirement is achieved.'
If, after publication or distribution, one wishes to seek remedies against an infringer, the work must be registered with the
copyright office before a law suit is commenced in the federal
district court. Obtaining a copyright does not require the approval of an administrative agency as does patent. Copyright
protection is somewhat more limited than patent protection.
Copyright law protects primarily against copying, plagiarism,
and the unlawful development of derivative works, whereas,
patent law protects against infringing uses.8
The article by J. Clark Kelso and Alexandra Rebay,
"Problems of Interpretation Under the 1980 Computer
Amendment," deals with copyright problems. First of all, the
authors present a useful and understandable explanation of
how computer software is created. It is a process of translating
a human thought pattern into a step-by-step procedure that is
ultimately executed by a machine which "understands" only
in the sense that it detects the presence or absence of an electrical charge. In order to make the translation from human
thought to machine execution, computer programmers
develop flowcharts and write computer language translations
(for example, in BASIC), which are ultimately reduced to an
object code. The article then reviews the scope of the 1980
amendments to the Copyright Act to determine what aspects
or renditions of computer software are protected. The authors
examine such questions as whether the etchings or topography
on a semiconductor chip are subject to copyright. The authors
suggest that they are not in that "the chip is like the uncopyrightable chair built from copyrightable plans."
The authors also examine the copyrightability of object
code in the light of the 1980 amendments to the Copyright
6. 714 F.2d at 1253.
or "copr,"
7. Published works must bear a notice stating the word "copyright,"
or 0, and the name of the owner and year of first publication.
8. One apt comparison between copyright and patent law concerns use. If you
buy a copyrighted book, you may use it any way you wish, including letting all of

your friends read it. You may not, however, make copies of it (unless permitted, for
example by the doctrine of "fair use".) If instead of a book, the item involved were a

patented machine or process, you would not be able to use that process without infringement of the patent holder's rights.
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Act and the legislative history related to those amendments2
They conclude that the Act protects object code, as decided in
several cases before the courts of appeals.10 In further support
of their argument, they note that there is a practical or economic necessity to protect object code. If object code was not
protected, the purposes of the Act would be undermined, because for the computer program pirate, object code is
equivalent to source code.
The authors next tackle the problem of "fair use" under
17 U.S.C. section 117. Normally, copyright law allows one to
use a copyrighted work without infringement, so long as the
work is not copied. However, in computer usage there are certain demands imposed by the technology which may make it
necessary to copy or adapt a program in order to use it. Section 117 attempts to deal directly with the issue. The authors
deal with the question of fair use of computer programs by
moving step by step through five examples of the problems
presented by use.
The general scope of trade secret protection is discussed
in "Simultaneous Copyright and Trade Secret Protection for
Computer Programs" by Philip McGarrigle. The author notes
the essence and fragility of this branch of intellectual property law. Trade secret law is essentially a matter of self-help;
the owner of a trade secret succeeds in retaining his or her
rights only so long as secrecy or confidentiality is maintained.
As the author points out, trade secret protection is "forever
lost once the secret has been disclosed." In addition, the author surveys elements of the claim to copyright. Some of the
recent decisions concerning copyrightability of software are
discussed, and the author observes that "the Tandy case
stands for the proposition that not only are computer programs proper subject matter for copyright, but the mechanical
embodiment is also subject to copyright regulation."
With respect to computer programs, trade secret law and
copyright law offer alternative means of protecting intellectual
property. On the one hand, one might use trade secret law to
protect a program or other process by merely keeping that
9. The authors draw upon certain decisions decided before Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 104 S.
Ct. 690 (1983).
10. See id.; Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1982).
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process a secret. On the other hand, one might rely on federal
copyright protection which is achieved basically by affixing an
adequate notice of authorship and claim of copyright to the
chosen medium of expression. Can one have both means of
"yes."9
legal protection at the same time? McGarrigle argues,
He urges that the two systems of protection are not mutually
exclusive and that trade secret protection is not preempted by
copyright law when one affixes a copyright notice. The heart
of the problem is presented by 17 U.S.C. section 301, which
states the conditions of federal preemption in the area of copyright and similar state laws. The author states, "[t]he use of
state trade secret law does not seem to conflict with federal
copyright law and an analysis of section 301 indicates that the
policies of the preemption provision do not present any further obstacles." McGarrigle also expresses his view that dual
protection is appropriate in relation to the public interests
which are at stake, namely, fairer protection to inventors on
the one hand and appropriate dissemination of new information to the public at large on the other. It would be, in his
view, "no abatement of progress" to allow the simultaneous
use of copyright and trade secret protection of software.
PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE

Kevin MacKinnon's article, "Computer Malpractice: Are
Computer Manufacturers, Service Bureaus and Programmers
Really the Professionals They Claim To Be?," reminds us that
computer systems, like other processes, are subject to failure.
Some of these failures may be due to bad judgment or lack of
appropriate care on the part of those who design the systems
or who advise concerning their use. To meet this problem,
MacKinnon suggests that computer professionals should come
under the full force of professional negligence law. Those who
design and advise in the computer area have a degree of expertise which others necessarily rely upon. Because of this,
they should not be held to a general duty of due care, but like
doctors and lawyers, they should be held to "a duty to conduct themselves as reasonable persons having the skill and
learning commonly possessed by members of the profession in
good standing."
The professional "professes" a certain expertise. Thus,
while the consumer or client is in a position to choose whose
advice to follow and how far to follow it, he or she cannot
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gainsay the foundation of the advice. The professional has access to the special information of importance to a client and
should be accustomed to applying that information. Unless
the client, too, becomes a professional, he is, to a degree,
"stuck." In short, the client must rely on the professional's
judgment.
The element of reliance is critical to MacKinnon's approach. "The complexity of the computer field necessitates
• . . client reliance on the computer consultants and data programmers . . ." Since this is the case, the enhanced duty,
i.e., to perform with a special degree of competence of an expert in the field, must be recognized by courts and applied in
negligence actions against computer experts.
The article concludes with a discussion of the elements of
a cause of action for professional negligence in the computer
field. MacKinnon indicates that there may be difficulties in
establishing the precise limits of the computer professional's
duty, with consequent uncertainty as to when the duty of care
has been breached. This, however, is true of negligence in general and other fields of professional liability in particular. The
specific standards of care usually emerge from the requirements of the particular situation where the professional has
exercised his or her judgment." The article also comments on
the Statute of Limitations issues, specifically, when the cause
of action accrues. Finally, the author expresses confidence
that recognition of computer malpractice will not cause an unjustified "Pandora's box" of litigation. He urges that in cases
where damage arises from negligence of computer professionals, the law is simply obliged to provide an appropriate remedy. One such remedy would be a cause of action for computer malpractice.
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

The development of new processes in the high technology
area presents a conflict between the interests of employees
and those of their employers. The employer wishes to maximize the production and profit to be derived from its facilities
11. An unusual case where a court has, in effect, imposed a specific professional
requirement of general application is Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). In Hel-

ling the court held that the defendant ophthalmalogists were subject to liability as a
matter of law for failing to give tests for glaucoma.
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and the efforts of its employees, while the employees may
have separate desires to advance their careers, retain their
mobility, and do the best that they can with their individual
lives. The article by Elizabeth Smith, "Eliminating Predatory
Litigation in the Context of Baseless Trade Secret Claims:
The Need for a More Aggressive Counterattack," raises the
problem of the employer/employee conflict of interest with
the following hypothetical situation:
Motivated by a falling out with management over product
development strategy, several employees have left a large
company to form a competing business, selling a similar
product in the same marketplace. Outraged at this move
and determined to stop the new business in its tracks,
management of the large company immediately burdens
the new company with a hefty lawsuit. The lawsuit includes allegations that former employees misappropriated
valuable trade secrets from their former employer and
seeks an injunction to prohibit the new company from
continuing operation.
The author observes that under these circumstances some employers have appropriate legal claims, while others initiate legal controversies which might be properly described as shams
or merely vexatious litigation. In order to redress the balance
for employees who may face sham lawsuits, the author proposes that the courts recognize a new cause of action which
will protect the employees' interests. The elements of the
cause of action would be: (1) lack of probable cause for the
employer's trade secret lawsuit, (2) a showing of ulterior purpose, and (3) "improper acts by the trade secret plaintiff during the course of the trade secret litigation which result in
harm to the trade secret defendant."
LITIGATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Andrea Hirsch's article, "The Impact of Automated Litigation Support Systems On An Attorney's Standard of Care,"
examines the use of computers in litigation management and
control. The author suggests that in the future we may see
more widespread use of computerized systems for collecting,
ordering, and providing access to various documents and
items needed at trial. Furthermore, the author proposes that
attorneys may be obligated at certain points to use automated
support systems, or else be subject to negligence liability for
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failure to do so. It is suggested that attorney malpractice in
this area be evaluated by examining the following factors: (1)
the availability of automated litigation support systems, (2)
whether automated litigation support is available at reasonable cost, (3) whether automated litigation support is being
used to minimize or reduce an extraordinary risk, and (4)
whether the absence of automated litigation support was a direct cause of the injury.
Whether or not liability might be imposed on an attorney
for failure to use a computer in this way, it is well for lawyers
to continue to look around at the various ways in which data
processing is entering their business environment. Some items
will be appropriate to adapt to an individual's practice and
others will not. Fundamentally, it seems that the best choice
would be one made based on one's understanding of how he or
she works best in the increasingly complex environment of
handling legal problems.
Computer law is an interesting new area of legal development. Like the computers themselves, the new legal problems
will not go away. They will arise, take their particular shape,
draw on old legal doctrines, and perhaps create new doctrine.
This symposium has taken a look at some of these problems.
In conclusion, I wish to thank the editors and authors for
their work in presenting this interesting array of articles to us.

